University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Geography and the Environment Faculty
Publications

Geography and the Environment

2013

Renewable Energy and Human Rights Violations:
Illustrative Cases from Indigenous Territories in
Panama
Mary Finley-Brook
University of Richmond, mbrook@richmond.edu

Curtis Thomas

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/geography-facultypublications
Part of the Environmental Education Commons, and the Natural Resources Management and
Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Finley-Brook, Mary, and Curtis Thomas. "Renewable Energy and Human Rights Violations: Illustrative Cases from Indigenous
Territories in Panama." In The New Geographies of Energy: Assessment and Analysis of Critical Landscapes, edited by Karl Zimmerer,
162-71. New York: Routledge, 2013.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Geography and the Environment at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Geography and the Environment Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Renewable Energy and Human Rights Violations:
Illustrative Cases from Indigenous Territories in
Panama
Mary Finley,Brook and Curtis Thomas
Department of Geography and the Environment, University of Richmond
Local implementation of international climate policies is frequently obscure. The objective of our research is to
unpack the "black box" of carbon offsetting as it is being conducted in Latin American indigenous territories. Our
two case studies of renewable energy projects under construction in Naso and Ngobe villages in western Panama
show that carbon offsets in oppressive societies have the potential to cause social harm. Our cases illustrate
processes of green authoritarianism, spatial control, and social restructuring. The private developers constructing
the Chan 75 and Bonyic dams did not follow international standards for free, prior, and informed consent, and
state agencies reinforced private rights with physical violence. As the hydro developers await decisions on their
applications for verification under the Clean Development Mechanism (COM), we recommend COM procedural
reforms to assure respect for human rights, including the special rights codified in the 2007 UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. If not, project developers could use low-carbon objectives to justifY social
oppression. Key Words: carbon offsets, hydroelectric dams, Indigenous peoples, Panama, renewable energy.
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La implementaci6n local de pollticas dimaticas internacionales es frecuentemente oscura. El objetivo de nuestra
investigaci6n es destapar Ia "caja negra" de las compensaciones por carbono, como estan siendo aplicadas en
los territorios indfgenas latinoamericanos. Nuestros dos estudios de caso sobre proyectos de energfa renovable
en contrucci6n en las aldeas Naso y Ngi:>be, en el occidente de Panama, indican que los bonos de carbono en
sociedades opresivas potencial mente pueden causar dafio social. Nuestros casos ilustran procesos de autoritarismo
verde, control espacial y reestructuraci6n social. Los empresarios que estan construyendo las represas de Chan
75 y Bonyic no siguieron los estandares internacionales sobre consentimiento libre, anticipado y consciente, a
la vez que entidades estatales retorzaban los derechos privados con violencia ffsica. En tanto que los promotores
del desarrollo hidroelectrico esperan las decisiones sobre sus propuestas para verificaci6n de acuerdo con el
Mecanismo de Desarrollo Limpio (COM), nosotros recomendamos reformas de procedimiento del COM para
apuntalar el respeto por los derechos humanos, incluyendo los derechos especiales codificados en Ia Declaraci6n
de las NU sobre Derechos de los Pueblos Indfgenas. Si no se hace eso, quienes desarrollan este tipo de proyectos
podrfan usar objetivos orientados hacia la baja en emisiones de carbono para justificar opresi6n social. Palabras

clave: bonos de carbona, represas hidroelectricas, pueblos ind(genas, Panama, energfa renovable.

hould low-carbon development fragment communities and disrupt Indigenous peoples' collective institutions and subsistence practices?
Emerging from structural inequities and physical violence, the two hydro development projects we assess
potentially extend Radcliffe's (2007) Latin American

indigenous geographies of fear, racism, and unevenness
to the clean ener!,ry sector.
The Clean Development Mechanism (COM), an international framework to reduce greenhouse gas (GH G)
emissions as industrial countries finance low-carbon
projects in developing regions, has the potential to

S
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significantly influence global processes. There were
US$6.5 billion dollars of project-based COM finance
transferred in 2008 alone (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009).
By January of 2011, 2,700 validated projects existed
in seven_ty countries. In spite of a bifurcated mandate
to promote sustainable development along with GHG
emissions reductions, the focus of COM regulatory
tools on measuring carbon (e.g., monitoring methodologies, additionality assessment, 1 etc.) limits attention
to socioeconomic factors ( Capoor and Ambrosi 2009;
Gilbertson and Reyes 2009; U:ivbrand, Rindefjall, and
Nordqvist 2009). 2
In this article we assess whether carbon offsets can
cause social harm. In 2008, the Indigenous Environmental Network (lEN) and Society for Threatened
Peoples (2008) identified GHG mitigation projects
they believe violate indigenous rights in acts of carbon
colonialism, including several Panamanian dam sites.
lEN's claims, and documents from Cultural Survival
(e.g., Lutz 2007), spurred our 2009 fieldwork to analyze
two projects in Naso and Ngobe villages. 3 In western
Panama, renewable energy projects create intense pressure for governance and livelihood transitions (Cordero
et al. 2006; Paiement 2007; Jordan 2008; Finley-Brook
and Thomas 2010).
The central objective of our research is to unpack the
"black box" of carbon offsetting (Lovell and Liverman
2010). National and subnational implementation
of the policies emerging from international climate
institutions is often opaque (Lovbrand, Rindefjall, and
Nordqvist 2009; Bulkeley and Newell 2010). Since
2008, we have completed fieldwork on eleven carbon
projects in four countries, including Nicaraguan bagasse
cogeneration, forest carbon and hydroelectric dams
in Costa Rica and Panama, and Dominican wind development. Research methods include semistructured
interviews with project developers, state officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and impacted
populations. The nineteen interviews contributing
to this article drew from each of these sectors. Our
case study approach documents how decision-making
power and processes influence cost-benefit distribution
among stakeholders (e.g., host communities, investors,
government agencies, offset purchasers, etc.). 4
Naso and Ngobe community members charged the
Panamanian government with human rights violations
due to dam construction in their territories. As we
sought to contextualize their claims within broader
clean development trends, we uncovered an avoidance
of issues pertaining to indigenous land and cultural
rights in COM project documents throughout Latin
America, even in those located in Mexican ejidos (com-

munal lands). Academic research addressing injustice
in Latin American offsets tends to focus on biofuel or
forestry projects (e.g., Boyd 2009; McAfee and Shapiro
2010; Hazlewood forthcoming), creating a research gap.
In popular media (e.g., Dyer 2009), concerns about renewable energy COM projects in indigenous territories
are addressed.
Although we caution against generalizing from
our illustrative cases, we recognize similar patterns
in other indigenous territories (see, e.g., Hale 2002,
2004; Radcliffe 2007; Baldwin 2009). During hydro
development, private and state partners often attempt
to extinguish indigenous land claims (Paiement 2007;
Jordan 2008). With the rise of offset markets, we argue
that project developers might use low-carbon objectives
to justify their demands for local sociocultural change.
We highlight "stick and carrot" approaches that use
carbon credits as positive incentives while employing
physical force to assure project implementation. As
global environmental change influences expectations
for energy projects (Zimmerer 2011), we identify a
resurgence of historical prejudices that categorize
subsistence practices as inefficient and indigenous
customs as inferior. Before presenting the details of
our two case studies, we seek to contextualize events
in Panama, where state agencies and private firms selectively define sustainable development in renewable
energy projects in ways that allow them to pursue ncoliberal agendas while further marginalizing indigenous
communities.

Expanding Interests and Inequities in
Hydro Power
There is a historic pattern of unequal distribution
of costs and benefits in large-scale energy projects.
Hydrologic colonialism is a spatial process imposed by
big dams: high costs (e.g., ecological degradation,
resettlement, loss of resource access, etc.) are felt in
source landscapes and benefits (e.g., electricity, profit,
etc.) are exported (Bakker 1999; Bonta 2004; Desbiens
2004; Sneddon and Fox 2008). State agencies have
long justified large-scale energy projects as essential for
national economic development, in spite of obvious
spatial and social inequities.
We suggest that some large-scale CDMs might
extend these inequities. Fair distribution and social
consensus might be sidelined in COM decision making
because a major goal is to save money: Industrialized
nations finance mitigation in developing countries
because it is less expensive than cutting domestic
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emtsstons (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Gilbertson
and Reyes 2009; Bulkeley and Newell 2010). For host
governments, renewable energy COM projects are
an opportunity to capture foreign investment for the
expansion of infrastructure (Lokey 2009; Schreuder
2009), a pressing concern in countries like Panama
with rapid growth in electrical demand.
Approximately 60 percent of COM projects create
renewable energy and the largest COM sector in terms
of total number of projects is the hydro sector. 5 As
of January 2011, there were 800 COM-verified hydro
projects globally and 750 in the pipeline. 6 Our cases
involve foreign-financed, large-scale ( > 15 megawatts)
dams. Multinational firms sponsor a significant share of
large hydro COM projects (Haya 2007).
The hydro industry suggests large dams can be socially responsible as well as ecologically friendly (International Hydropower Association 2007). The project
developers in our case studies are Colombia's state utility company (Empresas Publicas de Medellin, or EPM)
and a Panamanian subsidiary ofU.S.-based AES Corp.7
Both firms claim to be industry leaders in corporate
social responsibility (AES-Changuinola 2008; EPM
2009). Our case studies suggest these firms recast negative social consequences as economic development in
ways that are both superficial and harrowingly profound.

maintains an instrumental role for governmental and
quasi-governmental agencies (Giddens 2009; Bulkeley
and Newell2010). State agencies continue to influence
the type, pace, and form of resource commodification
tied to specific COM projects (Lokey 2009; Schreuder
2009).
Processes in Panama reflect the hollowing out of the
state as responsibility for watershed management, public education, and energy infrastructure shifts to the private sector. At the same time, authoritarianism seeps
out of complex rearticulations of governance and regulation (sensu Swyngedouw 2000). The state and private
sector join forces to constrict local resource access and
disempower Indigenous peoples, in spite of Panama's
recognition of semiautonomous indigenous territories
(comarcas) over the past century. 8 Across national and
institutional landscapes, support for racial and classbased privilege rooted in colonial and imperial histories
remains clear (Swyngedouw 2000; Hale 2002, 2004;
Radcliffe 2007; Jordan 2008).
When Latin American Indigenous peoples oppose
development projects, they. might become targets of
state violence (Radcliffe 2007; Jordan 2008). Yet Hale
( 2002, 2004) identified concurrent politics of recogni- ·
tion where states legally codify ethnic rights in ways
that seem progressive but might still be manipulated to
limit access to land and resources. Tying race relations
to the valorization of GHGs, Baldwin ( 2009) suggested
that carbon markets can lead to the entrenchment of
racial hierarchies and limit Indigenous peoples' economic and political options. In western Panama, the
selective transfer of benefits (e.g., land payments, jobs,
gifts, carbon credits, etc.) to local individuals willing to
allow hydro development creates community division
such that the organization of alternatives or unified opposition becomes unviable (Jordan 2008).
Although neither project we assess had been verified by the COM at the time of writing, project developers had submitted proposals and, more important,
justified the dams using global climate change arguments (e.g., AES-Changuinola 2008; Rodriguez 2010). 9
Bonyic developers suggested in their COM application
that a main motivation for the project was to share carbon market benefits with Naso communities (Rodriguez
2010).

Private-State Energy Sector Partnerships
Neoliberal economic reforms, such as privatization
and deregulation, generally expand or reinforce the
power of multinational firms, and this is certainly
evident in the energy sector (Ahmed 2010). The
Central American Electrical Interconnection System
(SIEPAC), an integrated regional grid under construction across 2,000 kilometers, required extensive foreign
private investment. Energy projects linked to SIEPAC,
including the two Panamanian case studies, fit within
broader private-state economic development strategies
to exploit rural peripheries to fuel industrial and urban
areas.
Involvement of the private sector in Latin American
energy development signifies an important politicaleconomic shift with broad implications for industry,
trade, tax collection, and much more (Lokey 2009;
Schreuder 2009). Impacts from neoliberal reforms are
varied and remain tied to other international and
domestic policies (Mansfield 2004; Radcliffe 2007).
For example, the COM transfers extensive authority to the private sector because it is a project-based
framework often relying on implementation by firms,
although the vast rule-based structure of the COM

Hydro Development in Bocas del T oro,
Panama
After determining strong hydro potential in Bocas
del T oro Province in the 1970s, Panama set aside Palo
Seco Forest Reserve (Figure 1) in the 1980s to protect
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the watershed for energy production, but state attempts
to build dams in the region were unsuccessful (Paiement
2007; Barber 2008; Jordan 2008). Following privatization of Panama's Institute of Hydrologic Resources and
Electrification (IRHE) in 1998, there was vast investment leading to more than seventy new hydro concessions (Cordero et al. 2006). Eighty percent of Panama's
two dozen proposed and verified COM projects involve
dams.
The Panamanian state plans to redefine Bocas del
Taro Province. Paiement (2007, 126) described a vision a governmental official shared with him: "in the
next ten years the rivers and forests of Bocas del T oro
will be transformed by a series of dams, artificial lakes,
access roads, and transmission lines." 10 In this context,
state efforts to assure implementation of the first hydro
projects in the province, described next, gamer additional importance.

Green Authoritarianism in

majority owner (Paiement 2007). Later, HET promised
to transfer 25 percent of the project's carbon credits to
the local community (Rodriguez 2010). Santana's cooperation with HET, however, led many Nasa to accuse
him of being corrupt, although he maintained support
from a group offollowers (Paiement 2007; Jordan 2008).
The majority ofNaso elected a new king, but the Panamanian state and private investors continue to recognize Tito Santana. Nasa institutions were sufficiently
disrupted that in 2004 the Inter-American Development Bank cancelled loans promised to HET for dam
construction (Paiement 2004; Rodriguez 2010).
In June 2009, after HET decided to finance the dam
with internal funding, the National Environmental Authority (ANAM) granted a 1,246-hectare hydro concession (Rodriguez 2010). Construction began in spite
ofNaso protests (Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). In
June 2010, Nasa, seeking to halt Bonyic construction,
filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR). A series of IACHR petitions expose a pattern of Panamanian state oppression
of Indigenous peoples (see Mayhew, Jordan, and Rolnick 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010).
In June 2010, the Bonyic project applied for COM
verification. According to the application, at the time
of negotiation with HET, the Nasa were "in the midst
of a prolonged leadership crisis, caused by historical and
political factors, as well as by family feuds and personal
interests" (Rodriguez 2010, 16). This version of history
removes blame from HET and the Panamanian state,
although Paiement (2007) provides a detailed firsthand
account of their involvement in Nasa internal conflicts.
We have argued elsewhere that COM application
processes do not provide adequate, accessible opportunities for impacted communities to document concerns
(Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). In addition to a onemonth public commenting period on the lntemetY
developers are required to comply with national standards, as Bonyic did. 13 Describing the consultation process, the Bonyic COM application vaguely mentions "a
public discussion with local stakeholders" in 2005, and
greater attention is drawn to "highly positive" comments generated in Panama City at a clean production symposium (Rodriguez 2010, 49). Although it is
likely COM verifiers will request additional details, 14
this example suggests applicants might attempt to omit
essential information. In the next case study, the COM
application notes "ample support" from local populations (TOY-SOD 2008, 35), but when the UN Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous peoples visited the

Naso~ Tjerdi

I didn't know that the development I was promised had
people in uniforms militarizing our communities ... every
day more than ten or twelve police enter our
community .... They are taking care of the machines.
That is what they do. (Naso leader, conversation, 7 June

2009)
This Nasa leader's allegation, supported by other interviews and media coverage, was that Panamanian officials protect dam construction equipment from sabotage in the face of local resistance. We label this process
of state oppression to defend renewable energy sources
and market-valorized ecological processes green authoritarianism (see Peluso 1992; Neumann 1998).
As an example of green authoritarianism, Bonyic
dam obstructed progress toward legal recognition of the
Nasa homeland (Naso-Tjerdi; Paiement 2007; Jordan
2008; World Bank Inspection Panel 2009). The Nasa
were in the final stages of negotiating their comarca
when the Colombian state utility company EPM (and
two partner firms with minor holdings) purchased the
dam concession (Paiement 2007; Jordan 2008). 11 Nasa
leaders believe demarcation of Naso-Tjerdi was stalled
to assure dam construction, particularly after Nasa
began to vocalize opposition to the energy project
(Anonymous, conversation, 7 June 2009).
The Nasa are proud to have one of the few remaining
monarchies in the Americas, but disagreement over the
Bonyic dam split their kingdom (Paiement 2007). King
Tito Santana signed a weak agreement in 2003 with the
firm Hydroecol6gica Teribe (HET), of which EPM is the
165
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Figure 1. Bocas del T oro Province with dam locations.

project area, he found "significant discontent" (Anaya
2009, 10, authors' translation). Both statements are se~
lectively true, as the dam created a social rift.

the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, however, an international norm Panama supported, involuntary resettle~
ment is prohibited in indigenous territories.
In 2007, Panama's National Assembly Resolution
Number 1228 decreed that the four Ngobe villages in
the proposed flood zone would be permitted to stay
within the Palo Seco Forest Reserve if they relocate to
allow dam construction (Jordan 2008). Modem Ngobe
settlements in this area predate the reserve's creation
(Anaya 2009), but inhabitants were not allowed to reg~
ister their lands prior to the dam concession (Jordan
2008; Mayhew, Jordan, and Rolnick 2009). The World
Bank loaned funds in 2001 to Panama's National Land
Administration Program to title Ngobe-Bugle Comarca
(Figure 1) annex areas (World Bank Inspection Panel
2009), including Ngobe and Naso villages in this study.
A decade later these villages remain without land titles.
AES-Changuinola's 2007 contract with the state
environmental agency ANAM privatized responsibility for 6,215 hectares of the Palo Seco Forest Reserve
(Jordan 2008). Because watershed protection is necessary for hydroelectric production, the firm will restrict
the clearing of agricultural fields: "[Resettled populations] are being trained on farming techniques and

Spatial Control and Social Restructuring in Chan

7515
In 2007, Ngobe villagers blocked Chan 75 dam
construction for two weeks until national police beat
and arrested protesters, including women and children
(Barber 2008; Cultural Survival 2008; Jordan 2008).
Since this protest, national police receiving salaries
from AES~Changuinola screen movement to and from
the zone. According to the UN Special Rapporteur
on the rights of Indigenous peoples, the contractual
relationship between state security forces and AES~
Changuinola is concerning due to evidence of unequal
power and pressure tactics (Anaya 2009).
Four Ngobe villages (Changuinola Arriba, Charco
de la Pava, Nance de Risco, and Valle del Rey)
are being resettled without free, prior, and informed
consent (Anaya 2009). AES~Changuinola notes compliance with World Bank standards for involuntary
resettlement. 16 Based on the 2007 UN Declaration on
166
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Figure 2. Chan 75 dam in relation to
a Ngobe village (upper right). Source:
Photo by Mary Finley-Brook.

efficient production. Moreover, they are recetvmg
training on the sustainable environmental management
the communities must adhere to" (AES-Changuinola
2008, 47).
Company employees designed new forms of subsistence for local populations as tree farmers and as artisans
producing crafts for tourists expected to visit the artificial reservoir. Paternalistic social programs followed
state violence to quell local opposition to the dam
(Barber 2008; Cultural Survival 2008; Jordan 2008;
Anaya 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). Spatial control (i.e., fences, travel restrictions, loss of river
transportation) and pressure tactics (i.e., unwarranted
house-to-house searches, death threats, destruction of
crops and property) promoted isolation, fear, and desperation (IACHR 2009a). Dynamite blasts were loud
enough to force school closures in the nearby village of
Charco de Ia Pava (Figure 2}.
Chan 75 creates fundamental change in surrounding villages and positive social development could be
possible. For example, AES-Changuirtola (2008) has
established education and health care programs. Although the firm suggests that these efforts are evidence
of corporate social responsibility, the investments were
integral to a broader partnership with state agencies and
paved the way for AES-Changuinola to receive the hydro concession. Furthermore, AES-Changuinola's social programs, as well as the firm's commitment to share
20 percent of earnings from carbon offsets with the
state environmental agency (Finley-Brook and Thomas
2010), allows the government of Panama to avoid pay-

ing for basic programs and services generally defined
as state responsibilities. Social assistance can also be
used to counteract allegations of harm caused by dam
development or to mask other injustices.
AES-Changuinola's (2008) plans to improve Ngobe
living conditions create significant cultural change,
such as splitting multigenerational households into nuclear families. Traditional houses were categorized as
instituting "confinement'' due to "inadequate use of
conStruction materials" (AES-Changuinola 2008, 43).
New cement structures are "dignified," in contrast to
customary wood and palm structures that left inhabitants "exposed to rain and diseases" (AES-Changuinola
2008, 50).
AES-Changuinola representatives negotiated relocation accords and compensation for land use by household, creating upheaval within families because individuals signed resettlement agreements in representation of
other family members even when they lacked this legal
right (Lutz 2007; Jordan 2008). Discrete negotiations
with each household unit were inappropriate because
land is communally owned (Barber 2008; Jordan 2008).
The firm's disbursement of gifts and money during negotiations also contributed to social tension (Jordan
2008),17
In 2009, the IACHR advised the Panamanian state
to halt dam construction and consult with the Ng5be
in good faith. Negotiations occurred while construction advanced. Decisive meetings were held in Panama
City, meaning select village representatives negotiated
without community support and other villagers were
167
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unable to monitor events (Mayhew, Jordan, and Rolnick 2009 ). Displeased Ngobe suggest state officials
made sure that dam opponents were not allowed "at
the table" (IACHR 2009a, audio recording, authors'
translation). The accord signed between village and
state representatives stated that both parties agreed to
work together to assure timely dam completion.
The IACHR brought the Panamanian state to the
Inter-American Human Rights Court (CIDH) in May
2010. The court decided to disregard the IACHR's recommendation to halt dam construction because judges
were not convinced the matter was "extremely serious"
or "urgent" (CIDH 2010, 9-12, authors' translation).
Panamanian officials testified that by mid-2010 only
a handful of families had not signed relocation agreements with AES-Changuinola (CIDH 2010). Judges
highlighted acceptance of money and land settlements
on the part of various members of the indigenous communities, while noting the existence of unclear dates
for alleged death threats and pressure tactics.
The Chan 75 application has been in the COM
pipeline since 2008. The verdict remains unclear at
the time of writing. The consultation process leading
to the application was poor. ANAM's public meetings
in reference to the dam in 2005 were held in a town
located six hours away from the four communities to
be resettled (Anaya 2009). A letter from members of
the Charco de la Pava village opposing the project was
sent to ANAM in 2007 during the prevalidation public
consultation period for AES-Changuinola's concession,
hut state officials approved the concession nonetheless
(Anaya 2009). Chan 75's COM application made no
mention of the land tenure conflict or social opposition
(TUV-SUD 2008). No comments were received during
the thirty-day online COM public commenting period.

Our research suggests GHG reduction projects in
indigenous territories can adversely affect local selfgovernance, land tenure, resource access, and subsistence practices (see also Lohmann 2006; Baldwin 2009;
Lovbrand, Rindefjall, and Nordqvist 2009; Mate and
Ghosh 2009; Hazlewood forthcoming). The protection
of cultural rights is lacking in COM requirements and
Indigenous peoples have insufficient influence over carbon offset decisions (see also Finley-Brook and Thomas
2010). For example, there are no COM guidelines to
protect cultural heritage. We are aware of two Panamanian projects in the COM pipeline that destroyed or
displaced ancient ancestral sites including cemeteries.
Hydro development and carbon markets involve spatial imbalance in terms of the distribution of costs and
benefits. Although Latin American COM projects are
often linked to high-stake energy markets, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
oversight processes focused on GHG emissions currently lack safeguards against exclusionary and harmful
practices. Findings from our two cases suggest that the
COM might contribute to hydrologic neocolonialism
in some instances; however, constraints to local participation arc not limited to dam projects. Regardless
of COM project type, greater attention appears necessary to defend local populations from authoritarian
spatial control linked to the imposition of externally
defined institutional arrangements and neoliberal ecological practices.
We expect that solving social justice issues in international carbon offset and renewable energy projects
will be complex. For example, stipulations such as prohibiting COM projects in untitled indigenous territories·
could create perverse incentives for the privatization of
communal property if broader sociopolitical injustices
arc not addressed first. Although the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides important
guidelines, its impact might remain limited if even the
Inter-American Human Rights Court averts the Declaration's fundamental call for free, prior, and informed
consent, as apparently occurred in the case of Chan
75. For low-carbon development to be considered truly
"clean," it is necessary to eliminate pervasive social inequalities and oppression in addition to reducing GHG
emissions.

Neocolonial Carbon Projects and
Indigenous Communities
Green authoritarianism and carbon colonialism are
evident in the construction of both the Chan 75 and
Bonyic dams. In these case studies, state agencies and
private firms worked in partnership to dominate and
oppress local populations. With support from the state,
developers used physical force to assert claims to exploit or protect natural resources with market value.
Working in partnership, state actors and private firms
have obligated Naso and Ngc~be villages to experience
what Radcliffe (2007) defined as Latin American Indigenous peoples' geographies of fear and inequitable
development.
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17. Derails of financial settlements have not been publicly disclosed. Resettlement contracts transferring land
holdings were signed with one person in
family,
even though in some instances other family members
were opposed to relocation (Jord<1n 2008). Firm representatives pressured illiterate individuals to "sign" (by
thumbprint) resettlement agreements (Lutz 2007; Jord,in
2008).
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1. Additionality suggests that a project would not have
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